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THE STATES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS.
conduct of a nation's foreign relations may be affected to
T HEconsiderable
extent by its internal governmental organizaa,

tion. Generally speaking, a more energetic and effective foreign
policy is possible for a nation whose government i!t characterized by
unity and coherence. Thi~· is true no.t only with reference to the
relations between the -departments of the central government, but
also with reference to the relations between the central government
and the local or state governments. In countries whose government
is based on the federal plan,. therefore, an important question to be
considered is that as to the extent, if any, of the control over foreign
relations to be assigned to the component governmental subdivisions.
The tendency in federal, and even in confederate, governments is to
restrict within very narrow limits, if not absolutely .to prohibit, any
direct control by the componen.t states over foreign relations.
Under the Articles of Confederation the diplomatic, war, and
treaty powers were, in terms, vested in the central government, and
the powers of the states in those respects were restricted within
narrow limits. The Arti_cles, however, protected the legislative power
of the states with reference to foreign commerce even as against
the power of the central government to control foreign relations.
treaties, and, in practice, this operated as a serious limitation upon
the power of the central government to control foreign relations.
The confusion resulting from divided control over commerce was
one of the principal ca.uses lea.ding to the adoption of the Constitution.
The experience secured under the Articles led to the placing in
the Constitution of strict limitations· upon the power of the states in
·connection with foreign relations. They were absolutely prohibited
from ma.king treaties, but treaties made under the authority of the
United States were declared to be the supreme law of the land, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the laws of any state. Moreoter, the states were prohibited, without the consent of Congress,
from entering into any agreement or compact with a foreign power
and from engaging in war, unless in imminent danger of invasion.1
•The powers of the states, moreover, are restricted with reference to the
regulation of foreign commerce, and the levying of import and export duties.
It should also be mentioned in this connection that the state courts are ex-
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'!'he term "war" properly refers to an armed conflict "between nations and, as here used, probably refers to danger from a foreign
source or from Indians.~
In 1839 our relations with Great Britain became strained on account of the disputt> over the location of the Northeastern boundary
line between Maine and Canada. During that year, what was known
as the "Aroostook War" broke out between Maine and New Brunswick when opposing forces were marched into the disputed territory. The United States and Great Britain, however, entered into
negotiations for a treaty to settle the dispute. "It was deemed necessary on the part of our Government to secure the cooperation and
concurrence of Maine. so far as such settlement might involve a
ce:;sion of her sovereignty and jurisdiction as title to territory
claimed by her, and of Massachusetts, so far as it might involve a
cession of title to lands held by her. Both Maine and Massachusetts
appointed commissioners to act with the Secretary of State anq, after
much negotiation, the claims of the two states were adjusted and
the disputed questions o-f boundary settled." 3 The result was the
Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842, by article V of which the United·
States agreed to receive and pay over to Maine and Massachusetts
their share of the "disputed territory fund" and also to compensate
those states by the payment of a further sum of money on account
of their assent to the boundary line fixed by the treaty;'
.
Although the claims of the two states were recognized by the
treaty, they were not adjusted directly by those states, but by the
Government of the United States acting on their behalf. As has
been suggested, Webster did not consider the coqperation of the
state authorities a constitutionjil necessity, but rather that it was
expedient from a political standpoint that the opinion of these states
should be considered.s This writer admits, however, that states
eluded from jurisdiction in cases to which foreign ambassadors, other public
mini~ters, or consuls are parties.
• W. W. Willoug~by, CoNSTITUTIONAI. LAw OF THE UNitto STATES, II,
1239. Chief Justice Taney, in Luther v. Borden (7 How. 1) declared that
Rhode Island, during Dorr's Rebellion, was in a state of war; but this was a
misuse of the term, as was pointed out by Justice Woodbury in his dissenting opinion.
•Ft. Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, II4 U. S. 541, quoting 5 WEESttR'S
WORKS 9'); 6 ibid. 273.
• MALLOY, TREATIES. etc., I, 654.
• \VILLOUGHBY, op. cit., I, 509-
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might possibly have international dealings with reference to such an
unimportant ~tter as the administration of fishing upon boundary
waters.• In this connection, it has been-suggested that a state might
enter into an agreement with Canada or a bordering Canadian province to regulate fisheries in their contiguous waters, in the absence
of a formal treaty by the United States regulating the matter. "May
there not,'' this writer asks, "pr-0perly be an autonomy in local external affairs, at least as to the states bordering on Canada or
Mexico, j_ust as there is a local · autonomy in matters· purely
domestic ?"7
The question came before the Supreme Court in 1840 as to whether
the surrender to the Canadian authorities by the governor of Vermont of a fugitive from justice was within his constitutional power.
There was no judgment rendered in. the case since the court was
equally divided on the question of jurisdiction, but a majority of the
judges, including.Chief Justice Taney, were of the opinion that the
governor did not have the power to deliver up the fugitive to a
foreign government. In his opinion, Taney pointed out that such
a delivery inv9l\red the making of an agreement wj.th a foreign government, which the states were incompetent to make without the
consent of Congress.11 Many years later the same court declared,
obiter, that "there can ·be little doubt as to the soundness of the
opinion of Chief Justice Taney that the power exercised by the governor of Vermont is a part of the foreign intercourse of this country, which· has undoubtedly b~en conferred up0n the Federal Government; and that it is clearly included in the treaty-making power,
and the corresponding power of appointing and receiving ambassadors and other public ministers. There is no necessity for the
states to enter upon. the relations with foreign governments, which
are necessarily implied in ·the extradition of fugitives from justice
found within the limits of the stat~, as there is none why they should
in their own name make demand upon foreign nations for the surrender of such fugitives. At this time of day and after the repeated
examinations which have been made by this court into the pow.ers
of the Federal Government to deal with all such international ques• Ibid., I, 508, note 23.
• J. F. Barnett, "International Agreemf'.nts Without the Advice and Consent of the Senate," YAU: L11.w JouRNAL, XV, 23, ZJ. But see, contt'a, Bun.El!,
Tn11.TY-MAKING PoWER, I, sec. 123.
• 14 Pet. 540.
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tioJl.S exclusively, it can hardly be a;dmitted that, even in the absence
of treaties or acts of Congress on the subject, the extradition of a
fugitive from justice can become the subject of negotiation between
a state of t~e Union and a foreign government."11
The governor· of a state from which a fugitive from justice has
fied to a ·foreign country must ordinarily act thr.ough the Secretary
of State at Washington in demanding from such government the
return of the fUgitive in accordance with extradition treaties between
the two countries. 'The situation would doubtless be aJtered, however, where there are acts of Congress or treaties of the United
States expressly authorizing extradition proceedings to be conducted
by the govern.or of the state directly with the authorities of the foreign government. Thus, by our treaty of 1861 with Mexico, the
chief executives of the border states and territories were authorized
to make requisitions and to. grant extradition in certain cases.1 •
Again, by our extradition· conventions with Denmark and the ~ etherlands, it is provided that application for the surrender of a criminal may be made directly to or by the governor or chief magistrate
.of the island possession or colony of the respective countries.11 In
such cases, it may be ~aid that the chief executive of the state or
territory is acting primarily as the agent of th~ United States Government.
In general, however, it is true that, for all practical purposes, the
direct contact of the state governments with foreign governments is,
under the Constitution, reduced to-a.negligihie quantity. The general doctrine on this matter has been laid down by the Supreme Court
in a numli:er of cases. Thus,. in the Arjona case, wherein was upheld
a Federal statute punishing the counterfeiting in the United States
of the securities of foreign nations, the Court said: "The Government of the United States has been vested exclusively with the
power of representing the nation in all its intercourse with f(}reign
countries. * * * Thus all official intercourse between a state and
foreign nations is prevented, and exclusive authoritv for that purpose given to the United States."12 Again, in tbt C~inese exclusion
c~se, the Court says: "For local interests, the several states of tlie
'United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407 (1886).
u26. This provision was renewed by the treaty of 1899, 1oid.,
n88. Cf. Moott, ExTRAnl'l'IoN, I, 53-78.
:u MALLOY, 395, l2'J2.
12
United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479.
,. MALLOY,
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Union exist; but for international purposes, embracing our relations
with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power."u
The same principle is t1!us stated by the Court in the LegaJ Tender
case= "The United States is not only a government, but it is a
·national government, and the only government in this country that
has the character of nationality. It is invested with power over all
the foreign relations of the country, war, peace and negotiations and
intercourse with other nations; all of which are forbidden to the state
governments." 14
Although the general principle, as thus stated by the Supreme
Court, is undoubtedly correct as far as the direct control by the states
over foreign relations is concerned, it is still possihl~ for the states
to take action which may indirectly affect such relations. The extent
of such indirect influence may, of course, vary considerably. State
legislatures not infrequently pass resolutions petitioning Congress or
the Executive to take or not to take certain action in connection with
our foreign relations: or expressing congratulation or sympathy with
particular foreign countries. 15 Such a resolution is likely in many
cases to be a mere brut~m fulnum and is usually pure buncombe. A
feeli,ng is growing apparently that the state legislatures should not
thus. attempt to take a hand in foreign affairs unless the question is
deemed peculiarly to affect the welfare of the state.
A more important method by which a state may indirectly influence foreign relations is through the taking of action which may purport to affect the status of aliens residing in such state, or through
its failure to take action for their protection in the exercise of rights
which they claim under treaties. This situation is thus described in
a ·Senate document relating to the power of recognition: "A state
of the Union, although having admittedly no power whatever in
foreign relations, may take action uncontrollable by the Federal Government, and which, if not properly a. casus belli, might nevertheless
as a practical matter afford to some foreign nation the excuse of a
declaration of war. We may instance the action which might have
been taken by the state of Wyoming in relation to the Chinese massacres, or the state of Louisiana in relation to the Italian lynchings,
13
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581, 6o6; cf. Fong Yue.
Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698.
"Knox v. Lee, 1·2 Wall. 457, 555.
"Thus, in 1897, the Senate of Nebraska adopted a resotution extending
to Cuba their sympathy. U. S. Senate doc. 82, 54th Cong., 2nd sess.

STATES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

or by the state of New York in its recent controversy with German
insurance companies with relation to the treatment of its own insurance companies by Germany." 16. As to whether the action of the·
states in such matters is, in all cases, uncontrollable by the Federal
Government, there may be some question, but, judging by the number of instances in which the nation has been embroiled in interna~
tional difficulties by the action or ,non-action of the states, it would
seem that no effective means of preventing such action has yet been
devised. Some of the difficulties enc_ountered have been due to the
lack of protection afforded aliens by the states against individual or
mob violence and the lack of means of redress afforded against such
mJuries. Congress could probably constitutionally proyide such.
means of redress through Federal agencies, but has thus far failed
to do so.11 Other difficulties arise from the passage of acts or ordinances by states or municipalities which discriminate or are alleged
to discriminate against aliens in violation of their treaty rights.
Among these are labor laws, land laws, and those regulating the
privilege of attending the public schopls. ·Some of these, as enacted
in various states, have been declared unconstitutional by the courts
as in violation of treaty provisions. Probably the most conspicuous
of the state laws and local ordinances which have given rise to international difficulties are the San Francisco school ordinance and the
California alien land law, aimed at aiiens. ineligible to citizenship.
The public sentiment in that state on the matter is forcibly indicated
by the adoption in 1920 through the popular initiative by a vote of
three to one of an alien land law, against which Japan is said to
have protested as in violation of treaty rightsJ 8
,. U. S. Senate doc. 56, 54th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 5.
" Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678.
"The action of the' people of California in enacting directly through the
popular initiative this alien land law is an example of popular influence in foreign affairs, exercised in a somewhat novel fashion. The desirability of having
the support of public opinion in the conduct of foreign relations has often
been recognized by various President~, who have sometimes made direct
appeals to the people on behalf of particular policies. The importance of
public opinion in such matters has also been recognized by other governments,
as was illustrated by their attempts to influence it, before our entrance into
the World War, through securing control of newspapers and other means of
publicity and propaganda. There has been .much said in favor of the democratic diplomacy of full publicity. Intelligent and judicious influence by the·
people in foreign relations, however, presupposes a cc;msiderable degree of

69~
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It is not necessary here to elaborate upon t!:iis topic. It may be
said, howeyer, tha~ the treaty-making power has itself at .times recognized the desirability .of avoiding, if possible, a conflict with the
states in attempting to regulate matters otherwise under their control. Provisions have been inserted in treaties which, instead of
·purporting directly to control the matter in question, merely constitute an undertaking on the part of our Government to recommend
to the ~tates ~he taking of the appropriate action. The earliest ex:.
~ple of this is contained in article V of the treaty of 1783 with
Great Britain, by which it was agreed th3.t the Confederate Congress
should "earnestly recommend to the. legislatures of the respective
states to provide for the restitution of all estates" of British subjects.111 Examples of. similar provisions may also be found in treaties
popular education iri such matters. '£he extent of desirable publicity in foreign policy is logically limited by the extent to which the people can exercise
an effective· control, and that includes merely general policies aµd not details
nor matters requiring quick decision. Some persons have adv~ted a popular
t"eferendum on the questi9n of peace or war as a preliminary step to the
entrance into war by the United States. W. J. Bryan has' gone on record as
declaring that "a referendum on war would give greater assurance of peace
than any other provision that could be made." (Editorial ·reprinted in CoNGRSSSlONAL Rr:ooRD, January 22, 1920, p. lg66:) The delay, ·ho~ever, which
would be produced in coming·to a decision if such a plan were adopted would
seem alone to be sufficient to render .it impracticable. There are many matters
arising in connection with the conduct of foreign relation&; especially during
a crisis, which cannot safely brook the delay necessarily involved in a popular
referendum. The inherent defects. of the control of foreign policy by a
delilierative assembly would be greatly enhanced by the adoption of such a
plan. Often thl(re is no time for consulting the· popular
and, even if it
were done, in. many cases no
answer would or could bC given. It would
-be difficult· to frame the issue, for the maneuvers of the foreign government
would be an uncertain and uncontrollable factor in the situation. The objections to the popular referendum in foreign affairs have been summed up as
follows: "The referendum is nOt advisory in any honest ·sense of the word,
because the decision of the government must. be composed of an intricate
series of problems which cannot be isolated.. On most of the points the
answer is not yes or no but a course of action with µiany ramifications of
detail. A government dependent on ref~rendum for advice about every
crucial point could survive only in a world where magic kept everything
frozen tight while the referendum was ·being taken. hi a world of swift
action, of surprises, of intrigue, there can be neither safety nor success for
an administration which had no power to act." (TH:e N:ew Rr:PUBLlC, Feb.:.
ruary 24. 1917, p. 92,)
.,
.,; MALLOY, fuATIEs, etc., I, 588.

clear

will
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made since the adoption of the Constitution. Thus, by article VII
of the treaty of 1853 with France, it is provided that "as to the states
of the Union, by whose existing laws aliens are not permitted to hold
real estate, the President engages to recommend to them the passage
of such laws as may be necessary for the purpose of conferring this
right." 20
Instances of tr!!aty provisions such as those cited above have been
rare, and, as has been pointed out, if the United States were required,
as a rule, to resort to such procedure, the ultimate result would be that
few nations would be· willing to grant us privileges fa exchange for
a promise on the part of our Government· merely to recommend to
the states the granting of a similar privilege.21 The courts have
construed the treaty-making power as extending to all matters which
are appropriate subjects of international negotiation,22 ·and, as the
Supreme Court declared in the Arjona case, "the national government is * * * responsible to foreign nations for all violations by the
United States of their international obligations."23• This being the
case, it follows that the.National Government must have power commensurate with-- its responsibility. Ultimately, by Congr~sional
action, or by constitutional amendment if necessary, means of ".On- .
trol must be provided for the preservation of treaty rights by. the
National Government. At the same time, care should he taken, so
far as possible, that no treaty engagements should be entered i~to,
the carrying out of which will arouse the deep-seated hostility of the
great majority of the people in particular states.:.
JoHN

M. MA'l'm:ws.

University of Illinois.
•Ibid., I, 531. Cf. a similar provision in the treaty of 1871 with Great
Britain, ibid., I, 7n.
11
Cr~dall, TRr:A'l"Its, THDR M.'>KING AND ENFORcr:Mt:NT, p. 2fr;.
u De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 ·U. S. 256, 26(,..7; cf. Missouri T. Holland,
252 u. s. 416.
.
,. United States v. Arjona, 120 U. S. 479,. Gr:NERAL Rr:nRr:Na:s.-Crandall, ·s. B., Tat:Anr:s, THt:Ut llAJtING AND
ENFORGSL:ENT, pp. 141-145, and chap. XVI.
Bruce, A. A., "The Compacts and Agreements of S~ates with One Another and with Foreign Powers," M1NN1'lSOTA LAW Rr:vn:w, June, 1918, pp.
500-516•
.Barrett, J. F., "International Agreements without the Ad"{ice and Con-.
sent of the· Senate." YAU I.Aw JoURNAI., XV, 18-27.

